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The generalised conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together 
from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience (James, 
1967, p. 136). 
Kant's mature philosophy is dependent on a synthetic schema or operation of 
'faculties' of the human agent as individuated actor. His Second Critique, on Practical 
Reason, was anticipated with impatience by his contemporaries, who were also 
increasingly intolerant of the categorial subtleties of these synthetic operations, which 
seemed to privilege abstraction over political action and radicality. 
One of these contemporaries was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who in Kant's native 
city of Konigsberg published in 1792 an 'Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation', 
which was taken for a long-anticipated work on religion by Kant (La Vopa, 2001, p. 
82). 
It is perhaps useful, in this context, to point out an interesting inflection and 
dialectical gesture. Yuzo Hirose bases his account on the canonical 'ought' of the 
categorical imperative. He seeks to restore his own idea of a sensitive happiness via a 
'hypothetical imperative' (Hirose, 2010), which, if this is to be thought of without the 
necessity inherent in the categorical imperative, and which arguably misreads the 
choice implicit in the structure of the Kantian position, also returns us from the 
practical to the speculative agenda that Kant was so keen to separate-for example in 
the Preface to The Groundwork, which is authorially located between the two 
Critiques of reason (See Bennett's translators notes, available in the online text). 
Without being able to appreciate the possible contribution of Nishida and the Kyoto 
School of Philosophy to Kantian ethics at the time of writing, I can only suggest that 
Jerome Schneewind's two-volume work on Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to 
Kant, in addition to a later text The Invention of Autonomy, is an authoritative 
contemporary treatment of these issues. 
In Hirose's first sentence he speaks of 'following moral law' ; and I hope it will not 
seem pedantic if I insist that we must retain the definitive article-the moral law-
because in effect there is only one, or one for each rational being, which is very much 
the nub of the problem, throwing up both the internal disassociation of the individual 
actor and the rational homunculus detailing the 'ought'; and the external situation of 
social or universal import. Hegel, on inheriting the unsatisfactory stasis of Kant's 
ethical rationalism and its unsustainable relation to lawfulness or moral conduct, 
comprehensively trashes it in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here he interrogates the 
indifference of Nature towards the duty intrinsic to a Kantian moral view of the 
world, where, on the one hand, the 'independence of Nature towards moral purposes 
and activity, and, on the other hand, on the consciousness of duty alone as the 
essential fact, and of Nature as completely devoid of independence and essential 
© 2010 The Author 
52 MICHAEL MARSHALL 
being' (Hegel, 1978, pp. 365-366). Hegel is able to show that action which supposes 
itself to be moral is instead not actual (p. 375) and that, in the conflict between 
morality and duty 'absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole of Nature, and 
moral law to become natural law' (p. 376). Indeed in the Hegelian logical enterprise, 
if what is already in existence is violated by this compact or conformity between the 
so-called natural and moral laws (ibid.), the highest good itself is compromised by 
moral action, which would then render it superfluous: 'In the assumption that the 
highest good is what essentially matters, there is admitted a situation in which moral 
action is superfluous, and does not take place at all' (ibid.) In effect, the rationalism of 
Kantian morality dissembles as a suppression of moral action, because if morality as 
an implicit element 'is to be actual, the final purpose of the world cannot be fulfilled' 
(the moral consciousness finding itself simply perpetually opposed to Nature; not just 
unreconciled) (p. 377). Similarly 'we cannot understand how happiness is to be 
demanded for this moral consciousness on the ground of its worthiness' (p. 379). 
Hegel rather exposes this concern to retrieve happiness as 'without reference to 
morality', as arbitrary as the designation of an individual as immoral; and he claims 
that this designation itself is a pernicious 'judgment ... , an expression of envy which 
covers itself with the cloak of morality' (ibid.). 
So much for the Hegelian onslaught. Prior to examining the retrieval of a 
systematic notion of how to think about happiness that is useful for education-and 
given that Kant did not prepare or deliver a philosophical 'propadeutic' as did Hegel, 
so that to characterise this educational thought itself is a synthetic or syncretic 
process 1_1 want to return briefly to Fichte and another logical gesture associated 
with his Wissenschaftslehre, the thesis that he rewrote with Sisiphian fervour. If both 
he and Schelling, another contemporary and key figure in the legacy of Kantian 
practical philosophy,2 were experimenting with Idealist positions that render James' 
talk of Monisms (in the early part of Essays in Radical Empiricism) somewhat 
superfluous, a proposal made in the spirit of creative dialogue, that the AnstofJ or 
'stop' which logically distinguishes the Fichtean 'I' from the 'Not-I'3 and that would 
seem to anticipate aspects of Freudian psychology (James mentions Janet, whose 
mentor Charcot Freud himself studied with at the Salpetriere): this philosophical 
structure, which Fichte propounded as his system, is I would suggest a definitive 
method of linking experience and ( educative) growth, in a way that Kantian 
philosophy does not explicitly offer. The single possible exception to this would be 
Hannah Arendt's Chicago Lectures on the Third Critique, where telos and individual 
human dignity allow for a better route to a notion of educational good. 
In this sense, then, what Hirose postulates about the self-harming individual or 
suicide disrupts what he quotes Kant as terming the 'doctrine of happiness', and 
which he extrapolates as the principle of happiness. It also imperils the idea of 'the 
sum of satisfaction of all inclinations' that he shortens to the 'sum of inclination'. If 
Kant's call to self-knowing, Sapere audet, cannot be fully recuperated by a modem 
virtue ethics, neither can Kant service such an abstraction as this logical preference 
arising in a moral order. 
AFTERWORD 
In being permitted to extend and perhaps sustain the critical intentions of my colloquy 
on Hirose's paper, I intended to remedy the admission of unfamiliarity with Kitaro 
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Nishida and the Kyoto School that I make explicit in my initial remarks. For me, the 
scholarly signposting that both Hirose and our colleague Atsuko Tsuji were able to 
provide using the selected English translation of Nishida's 1911 inaugural treatise on 
the Good (Nishida, 1990)4 (styled rather as a study, or inquiry) was of inestimable 
practical help in gaining some appreciation of the philosophical coordinates of 
Nishida's text and indeed the larger enterprise of his philosophical endeavour, which 
has both characteristics of a ready assimilation of the panoply of Western thought and 
yet refuses any disengagement with a uniquely Japanese perspective on such activity. 
Prior to applying my resultant tentative understandings to aspects of the colloquium 
proceedings-in place, it is true, of any specific Kyoto School historical critique of 
Hirose's Kantian concerns-I wanted to signal my further intention to examine 
Nishida's subsequent 1917 investigation entitled Intuition and Reflection in Self-
Consciousness (1987) with its Fichtean methodological engagements. Nevertheless 
this lies in the future. 
First though, I must acknowledge that philosophy's grey-in-grey continues to 
abrade the sharper dialectical distinctions one thought to have drawn in an assumed 
attention to the critical project; and thus I am bound to revisit my objection to such a 
coinage as (a Neo-Kantian) 'hypothetical imperative' by admitting an occurrence in 
an earlier cited work of Schneewind (Schneewind, 1998, p. 486) where, in explicating 
the division between the so-called Precritical works and the architectonic of the 
Kantian Critical ensemble, Schneewind refers to Kant's annotations to a printed 
edition of his 1763 Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, 
wherein it is posited that a conditional and a categorical basis for 'objective necessity 
in action' are rendered successively as hypothetical (because individual appetites are 
held in check merely by the necessity of prudence) and categorical. The suggestion in 
further footnoted quotations from Kant's notes is that the conditional hypothesising of 
'the goodness of a free action' is means-related; while practical necessity is averred to 
obtain categorically, as an end. 
Again, Bennett's translator's notes to the Preface to the Groundwork, alluded to 
earlier, advise that 'A speCUlative endeavour is one aimed at establishing truths about 
what is the case, implying nothing about what ought to be the case' , reminding us that 
while there is a speculative/practical pair in Kantian thought, there is no pure/practical 
contrast (Kant, 2008, pp. 3-4). We might go on to inquire whether there is any 
resonance between the (moral) hesitations of the hypothetical constraint of 
appetites-in the Precritical stance-and a correspondingly objective speculative 
method that effectively subsumes it. My sense is that there is not-and that an 
answering alternative to the categorical imperative is not available in the mature 
Kantian canon. 
Clearly the attempt to develop 'a systematic notion of how to think about 
happiness in human development and in an educational context' presents any 
systematising enterprise with-as it were-a vanishing logic (of a solipsistic variety). 
If Professor Koyasu's paper identifies a distinctive notion of vitality embodied within 
the eastern tradition, 'a notion that values the connection between nature and society' 
(Koyasu, 2010), it also outlines and advocates a programme for 'revitalising 
education for dynamic hearts and minds'. Happiness, here, is a functional component 
of self-renewal-of a kind that is not susceptible to 'solipsistic independence'. It 
seems no accident, therefore, that happiness is implicated as a socially enforced 
optimism; as a collective enabler. One could say that it is non-individuated in its 
application. 
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What worries me about Suzy Horton's (2010) account of the UK initiative entitled 
Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning (an initiative that could share a common 
progenitor to Professor Koyasu's Centre of Excellence Programme in the US self-
esteem movement) is the instrumental understandings of Goleman's domains of 
emotional intelligence. It is surely perverse to determine that the 'art' of relationships 
is the axiomatic capacity to manage emotions in others; even if one would accept that 
this child is relatively new to recognising that others' emotions are not hers. This 
manipulative managerialism extends to oneself; where to master one's emotions in 
service of a goal allows one not only to practice self-motivation but to reach beyond 
paying attention to co-master creativity. Creativity in what, one may ask? Even if 
Horton pins down the elision of a critical distinction between a personal quality or 
trait, and a skill or competence that can be subsequently acquired, the inevitable 
dissimulation of this discourse of affect, combined as it is with an intolerance of the 
negative imprint of affect (as delinquency?) suggest that this creativity is itself 
bounded by the productive circumference of adult expectation; and like children's art 
itself, expires in the chill climate of that majority. 
When I first read 'On the Value of Happiness in Kant's Educational Thought' I 
found myself caught in a circuit of what I took to be its deliberate parataxis: this is 
why I itemised the contents in its three-part subdivision-not to provide an index. 
These three levels of sectional coherence were, I felt, evidence of the struggle to 
develop a theme that has no consensual support aggregated on a specific text or 
texts-Kant's educational thought-and is moreover threaded through with a seam of 
implicit Idealist rebuttal of the Kantian practical philosophy from Fichte to Schelling 
(and now, I discover, refracted in the vernacular insights of Nishida). 
The categorial riposte that I located in James, and seemed distilled in the 
epigraphic insistence on a non-transcendent paradigm of judgement, receives its echo 
in Nishida's counsel of a pure experience whose content can never be further enriched 
or overlaid, 'since the meaning or the judgement of experience is nothing more than 
the indicating of a relationship with another experience' (Nishida, 1988, p. 7). 
Nevertheless such a unity as this 'fact' of pure experience is disrupted by the 
qualitative comparison entailed, say, in the perception of a colour such as blue; so that 
such meanings and judgemeJ;lts-if they add nothing new to it-compromise its unity 
of consciousness. If Nishida here relies on a rather primitive sensory account of 
colour, the tonal chaos of a newborn child's adjustment to light (or is that the cultural 
depth of Tanizaki' s paean to shadow, In Praise of Shadows?) argues for a level of 
experience prior to differentiation, and in terms of which multiple attendant states of 
consciousness subsist. 
Later in the study, in the chapter entitled 'The Development of Reality through 
Differentiation' , and where the Abe and Ives translation engages with a literal Kantian 
index that the Viglielmo version displays reluctance to embrace (setting up other 
resonances with substantiality) Nishida suggests that the phenomenal register is 
merely 'the state of reality's development through differentiation' (Nishida, 1990, p. 
66). Even if one accepts the caution (see for example Schinzinger's evocative 
distinctions between Western and Japanese attitudes to writing and understanding 
philosophy [in Nishida, 1973, pp. 4-6] ) that there is an inherent poetics that English-
language analysis is unable to discern; one still tends to the view that the desk that 
Nishida gestures at-in a long tradition of empirical allegiance to the furniture of the 
studium-has its corollary in the transcendent aspects of language (i.e. Kant's 
noumenon), rather than any potential manifold of differentiation whereby 'a thing 
belongs to objectivity' (Nishida, 1990, p. 67). 
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If we admit, nevertheless, that Nishida's purpose is to demonstrate the vacuity of 
an abstract notion of subjectivity (so that a stricter and truer subjectivity can result, in 
terms of which the Good can be configured) one may yet be inclined to persist with a 
doubt about the starting point of pure experience, and his account of the reality thus 
guaranteed, if the sole method of effecting this cardinality of the real is via its 
occurrent fracturing in the process of differentiation. 
That this sounds like a Hegelian problem (the difficulty of a systematic beginning 
evinced in the Phenomenology, rather than the motifs of contradiction and infinite 
opposition per se) is amplified further when, in a key passage from Part III of the 
study, concerned with the Good, we are told that 'personality' is an activity; and one 
that refracts 'the unifying power of the universe' (p. 131). While this passage operates 
to negatively define personality (pp. 130-131), the better to attend to its implications 
for the self, that self in its truest immanent condition, is empty of impediments to the 
universalising draw of personality's orientation toward the Good. If 'the good is the 
actualisation of personality' (p. 142)-both translations concur on the slightly less 
Hegelian 'realisation' as an alternative-then we are able to bring to the fore a 
critique of Nishida's study in attending to the use of 'personality' in an inter-cultural 
recuperation of the Good. 
The idea of personality does not commit Nishida to the individuated particularity 
of persons as subjects that a twentieth century reader might expect. It enables the 
legacy of foundational Greek thinking about the purpose of an individual human life 
(albeit human life as determined by rather specific categories of value) to be 
connected to a universal purpose, without the detour into explicit problems of that 
subjectivity as properly other and fully individual. 
This puts a somewhat different complexion on the J amesianlHegelian notion of 
pure experience (depending on whether it is understood as a philosophical psychology 
or phenomenology of the self as its self-knowing in history). In assuming the Kantian 
moral law to ascribe 'absolute value' to the human personality (Nishida, 1990, p. 133; 
Nishida, 1988, p. 142), Nishida does not fetishise this value beyond its social validity. 
One might say that whatever kind of absolute value he intends in his consideration of 
Kant, it acts to obscure rather than expatiate on the difference between morality and 
ethics.5 
The foregoing anticipates a resumption of the conference dialogue on happiness 
and personal growth, and Hirose's contribution framed by his Kantian scholarship. If I 
have left this theme unattended by further resolution, it is because the implication of 
that theme flows in an alternative direction to what I find, with all the pleasures of 
discovery, are intermittently in view in the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida. I wish to 
thank, once again, my fellow conference participants for that gift. 
NOTES 
I acknowledge but disallow the 'compendious manual' of Jasche's edition of the lectures on Logic, 
fIrst published in 1800. 
2 Much of what Hirose is concerned to explore in section 4 is echoed and perhaps supported in a 
modifIed Kantian way in Schelling's early text Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism 
(1795), particularly the Eighth and the beginning of the Ninth Letter. See for example Schelling 
(1980). 
3 'The striving of practical reason is based on the "demand that everything should conform to the I", 
but this already presupposes the recognition that there is a "disparity" (Ungleichheit) between the I 
and the Not-I. Instead of the purely reciprocal mutual determination of theory by which the I and the 
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Not-I are made finite, practical reason asserts a one-sided determination in which the I is infinite and 
the Not-I finite. Yet the infinitude of the I involves a striving that does not yet possess causality but 
seeks it. Here it is not some external X that produces a check (AnstofJ) on the activity of the I but an 
inward sense of a disparity between striving and capacity' (Makkreel, 1994, p. 14). 
4 While this translation was preferred by others for close reading in conference session, I have felt it 
worthwhile to consult throughout an authoritative alternative, in service of a guidance that renders 
the fluid thought stream while (perhaps) offering less anchor-points in terms of a contemporary 
philosophical erudition. I trust the variable referencing can be accepted on this basis. 
5 Notwithstanding the four chapters on ethical theories included in Part III. 
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